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Abstract 
 
The literature on the effects of market concentration in platform industries or two-sided 
markets often compares the competitive outcome against a benchmark. This benchmark is 
either the “joint management” solution in which one decision maker runs all platforms or a 
“pure” monopoly with just one platform. Literature has not generally discussed, which 
benchmark is the appropriate one. We show that the appropriate benchmark, i.e. how many 
platforms the monopolist will operate, depends on whether agents multi- or singlehome, 
whether the externalities are positive or negative, and in some cases on the properties of the 
demand functions. Different situations require different benchmarks. Our results also help to 
anticipate the effects of proposed platform mergers, where the assessment might crucially 
depend on the number of platforms after a merger. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the last decade, an enormous amount of research has been done on “two-sided markets” or 
“platform industries”, starting with the seminal articles of Caillaud & Jullien (2003); Rochet 
& Tirole (2003). Many contributions are interested in the impact of market concentration on 
prices, quantities, and welfare. One approach to study such effects is to compare the 
competitive outcome against the monopoly benchmark. 
In doing so some contributions assume the monopoly to be a “joint management” of the 
existing platforms, i.e. they assume that all platforms continue to operate and are controlled 
by a single decision maker who maximizes joint profits [e.g. Ambrus & Reisinger (2006); 
Anderson & Coate (2005); Chandra & Collard-Wexler (2009); Weyl (2010)]. Other authors 
assume that a monopolist operates just one platform [e.g. Chaudhri (1998); McCabe & 
Snyder (2007)]. 
While sometimes a footnote points the reader to the fact that one could have used another 
benchmark [e.g. Anderson & Coate (2005); Chandra & Collard-Wexler (2009)], to our 
knowledge, only Ambrus & Argenziano (2009)] actually discuss, how many platforms a 
monopolist optimally chooses. They consider a situation with purely positive network 
externalities and singlehoming agents. In their model, the monopolist can choose between 
opening one or two homogeneous platforms. Consistent with our results, they find that a 
monopolist will always prefer to operate just one platform, if agents on each market side are 
homogeneous (their Theorem 2). They add that if agents are heterogeneous, there might be an 
incentive to operate a second platform in order to implement second-degree price 
discrimination. 
Other reasons why a monopolist may find it more profitable to run just a single platform, 
instead of multiple ones (or vice versa) could be the well-known ones from traditional 
markets, e.g. the presence (or absence) of economies of scale or high fixed costs. However, 
on two-sided markets, the monopolist must also take the impact of the number of platforms 
on the magnitude of the indirect network effects into account, when deciding how many 
platforms to operate. To understand the economic intuition, consider the case of 
singlehoming agents on both market sides, i.e. agents join at most one platform, and positive 
externalities that is, both market sides benefit from a high number of agents on the other 
market side. Then, because of singlehoming, operating two platforms would mean that the 
“joint manager” faces cannibalization effects in the sense that platforms steal members from 
each other, making both of them less attractive to agents than a large, unified platform. 
Agents would experience a higher gross utility on a unified platform that translates into a 
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higher willingness to pay, which results in increasing profits. As a consequence, in this case 
using the “joint management” benchmark would be of academic interest only. For practical 
purposes, e.g. when assessing the impact of potential mergers, such a benchmark would be 
misleading, as the merger would result in one platform being voluntarily closed by the newly 
formed monopolist. 
Real-world examples are manifold and can be found across many different industries. For 
instance, in 1999 eBay bought German rival Alando, and closed it. Since 2001, one of the 
major German cinema operators, Cinestar, took over movie theaters of two rivals in 
Chemnitz, Germany, just to close these locations shortly after. 
Of course, there are also many examples of platforms coexisting after merger, illustrating that 
it is not trivial to choose the appropriate benchmark. In 2009, eBay bought South Korean 
rival Gmarket, and both platforms coexist. In Rostock, Germany, Cinestar currently operates 
three movie theaters. After entering the market in 1991 buying two locations, they opened a 
third one in 1996. NASCAR operates multiple racing series. Next to their top-level series 
Sprint Cup, the Nationwide series fields similar cars and some drivers even compete in both 
series simultaneously, so that both series are almost homogeneous. 
The basic argument also applies to differentiated platforms, although product heterogeneity 
relaxes competition (or cannibalization), and hence, heterogeneous platforms might well 
coexist, were homogeneous ones would not. 
Since most two-sided market models focus on specific settings regarding the direction of 
network effects and regarding multi- or singlehoming of agents, this paper contributes to the 
literature by discussing the appropriate choice of a benchmark along these dimensions. In a 
rather general homogeneous two-sided market setting, we will compare a one-platform 
monopoly (OPM) with a two-platform monopoly (TPM).1 Whether the platform operator on 
a TPM is actually a monopolist or two platform operators with “joint management” or 
colluding oligopolists, is irrelevant as long as decision making is as if a monopolist owns 
both platforms. Profits will, ceteris paribus, differ in OPM and TPM for any given number of 
agents on each market side. If the OPM profit exceeds the TPM profit, the monopolist will 
rationally decide to close one platform. In this case, using a TPM as a benchmark to study 
competitive effects would be of theoretical interest only, because a TPM would be a fictitious 
case. For practical considerations, the OPM would be the appropriate benchmark. Vice versa, 
the TPM would be appropriate, if profits on a TPM exceeded profits on the OPM, because 
the monopolist would opt to open (or keep) a second platform. 
                                                
1 As a “two-platform” monopoly is sufficient to illustrate our point, we abstain from generalizing the model to 
a “n-platform” monopoly. The exposition would become more complex without adding to our argument. 
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Indeed, we find that for most cases, one profit function is unambiguously above or below the 
other. In other cases, we determine sufficient conditions the inverse demand functions must 
satisfy in order to draw clear-cut conclusions. Turning to the case of heterogeneous 
platforms, we built on the widely used model of Armstrong (2006) to study whether our 
results hold for heterogeneous platforms as well. This model has been used a lot in the 
literature, for instance recently by Weyl (2010), who generalizes the model with regard to the 
distribution of agents and compares the competitive outcome with a TPM. We find that in the 
specific setting of the Armstrong model, OPM profits exceed TPM profits, which highlights 
the importance of choosing the right benchmark in each of the many possible settings, and for 
each specific model. 
Our model and its discussion remain academic to some extent, as we assume away a number 
of empirically relevant aspects, which might either strengthen or weaken our results. The 
point is, however, that the effects of these left out aspects are intuitively straightforward and 
well-known from traditional markets without indirect network effects, so including them does 
not yield any additional insights, but makes the exposition more complex. One such aspect is 
binding capacity constraints. In a two-sided market context, the existence of such constraints 
ceteris paribus favors the existence of two platforms rather than one. Another aspect is the 
cost function, which might favor either a TPM, if there are low or no fixed costs or increasing 
marginal costs or an OPM, if there are high fixed costs or decreasing marginal costs. 
The paper is structured as follows: First we present a rather general model for homogeneous 
platforms, and discuss whether OPM or TPM is the appropriate benchmark depending on 
whether both market sides multihome, only one markt side multihomes, or both sides 
singlehome. Then we illustrate our results using a slightly modified version of Armstrong’s 
singlehoming model Armstrong (2006), in which we will also study the case of 
heterogeneous platforms. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Model Setup 
 
Consider a two-sided market in which there are 
! 
N
i
 agents on market side 
! 
i , where 
! 
i =1,2. 
Prices 
! 
pi  represent the prices charged to agents on market side 
! 
i , and are determined by the 
inverse demand functions 
! 
pi q1
i
,q
2
i( ) , where 
! 
q
1
i
,q
2
i
> 0  represents the relevant number of agents 
from the perspective of market side i. The relevant number of agents may or may not be 
equal to the total number of agents, depending on the market structure and other factors to be 
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discussed later. Inverse demand functions are assumed to be strictly decreasing in their own 
argument that is 
! 
"pi
"qi
i < 0 2,1, =i . 
 
In case of an OPM the profit function of the monopolist is defined as 
( ) ( ) ( )
2122211121
,,, NNpNNNpNNNOPM !+!=" .
2 
Since there is just one platform, the relevant number of agents is the total number of agents 
that is 
! 
q
1
i
= N
1
 and 
! 
q
2
i
= N
2
. However, in this case the total number of agents is also equal to 
the number of agents on the platform 
! 
n
i
, that is, 
! 
N
i
= n
i
. Therefore, OPM profit can also be 
denoted as  
! 
"OPM n1,n2( ) = n1 # p1 n1,n2( ) + n2 # p2 n1,n2( ) . 
Now assume, in contrast, that there are two perfectly homogeneous platforms on the market, 
which are jointly managed (TPM). Since these platforms are perfectly homogeneous, agents 
do not have any intrinsic preference for either one. We therefore focus on perfect symmetry 
that is both platforms are identical twins in terms of prices and patronage. Hence, each 
platform earns a profit defined by 
( ) ( )2
2
2
122
1
2
1
1112/ ,, qqpnqqpnTPM !+!="  
and because of symmetry, joint profits are 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )2
2
2
122
1
2
1
111
2
2
2
122
1
2
1
111
2/
,,
,,2
2
qqpNqqpN
qqpnqqpn
TPMTPM
!+!=
!+!!=
"!="
. 
The relevant number of agents depends on whether agents are allowed to multihome or 
restricted to singlehoming. Throughout the paper, we will use the following assumption: 
 
Assumption 1: Whether agents multihome or singlehome is an exogenous constraint. 
 
This assumption simplifies our analysis substantially, because multihoming agents will 
always join all or none of the available platforms. They are neither restricted by income nor 
do they voluntarily singlehome for other reasons. Independence of income is a common 
assumption in the literature. For instance Rochet & Tirole (2003) assume a demand function 
! 
Di pi( ) , in which demand of market side 
! 
i  only depends on the price charged to market side 
! 
i , but not on income. The model of Armstrong (2006) that will be used in subsequent 
sections, also excludes income effects. 
 
                                                
2 As we discussed above, the impact of costs is straight forward. 
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We are now able to define the relevant number of agents ( )ii qq
21
,  in ( )iii qqp 21 ,  for the TPM. If 
agents on market side 
! 
i  are allowed to multihome, they will join a platform, if their net 
benefit is positive. By Assumption 1, the decision to join a platform is independent of the 
decision to join the other platform at the same time. Independence of decisions implies that 
i
i
i
nq = . Since both platforms are perfectly homogeneous, an agent will ceteris paribus always 
join either both or none of the platforms so that total demand on the market is 
! 
2 " n
i
. 
If agents on market side 
! 
i  are restricted to singlehoming, they face the trade-off which 
platform to join. Joining Platform 1 implies that Platform 2 cannot be joined and vice versa. 
Since the decision to join a platform depends on the decision to join the other platform, the 
inverse demand function depends on the total number of agents on market side 
! 
i , reflecting 
rivalry for singlehoming agents, i.e. i
i
i Nq = . 
Independent of single- and multihoming, the relevant number of agents from the other market 
side, i
i
q! , is always the number of agents that join the considered platform, i.e. i
i
i
nq !! = . 
In our analysis, we consider three cases. If both market sides are allowed to multihome 
(Case 1), the corresponding inverse demand functions are 
! 
pi n1,n2( ). If side i is allowed to 
multihome, while side -i is restricted to singlehoming (Case 2), the corresponsing inverse 
demand functions are ( )
iii
nnp !,  and ( )iii nNp ,!! . If both sides are restricted to singlehoming 
(Case 3), the corresponding inverse demand functions are ( )iii nNp !, . 
 
3. Model Analysis 
 
Case 1 
First, we study the case, where agents on both market sides are allowed to multihome. Since 
we assumed perfect symmetry of the two platforms, we know that all agents, who join one 
platform, will join the other platform as well. The implications of this case are summarized in 
Proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 1: In case that the agents on either side of the market are allowed to multihome, 
and if at 
! 
n
1
,n
2( )  OPM profit is positive, TPM profit strictly exceeds OPM profit. In 
particular, we have 
! 
"
TPM
n
1
,n
2( ) = 2 # "OPM n1,n2( ). 
Proof: Denote the OPM profit function as 
( ) ( ) ( )
2122211121
,,, nnpnnnpnnnOPM !+!=" . 
Both market sides are allowed to multihome, therefore each platform in the TPM faces a 
willingness to pay given by 
! 
p
1
n
1
,n
2( ) and 
! 
p
2
n
1
,n
2( ) . Under TPM, agents simultaneously 
patronize both platforms, which yields 
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( ) ( ) ( )
2122211121
,2,2, nnpnnnpnnnTPM !!+!!=" . 
Comparing both profit functions easily reveals that ( ) ( )
2121
,2, nnnn
OPMTPM
!"=! . 
Obviously, we find that ( ) ( ) ( )
212121
,,,2 nnnnnn
OPMOPM
!">"# , given 
! 
"
OPM
n
1
,n
2( ) > 0 . 
(q.e.d.) 
 
Proposition 1 is not surprising given the stylizing assumption of our model. Since by 
Assumption 1 all agents who join the single platform in an OPM, also join a second, identical 
platform, if available, the monopolist is able to double her profits by offering a second 
platform. In fact, the monopolist could realize infinite profits by offering infinitely many 
platforms. Relaxing Assumption 1 would result in TPM profit being less than twice the 
OPM profit. However, the economic intuition of Proposition 1 continues to hold: If agents 
on both market sides multihome, a monopolistic platform operator has an incentive to operate 
more than just one platform, because it generates additional revenues. Different from the case 
of singlehoming agents, which we will discuss later, platforms are not rival in patronage; they 
do not cannibalize. 
  
Case 2  
A lot of applications require that one market side is restricted to singlehoming, while the other 
one is allowed to multihome. Armstrong (2006) coined the term “competitive bottlenecks” for 
this case. Without loss of generality, we will assume market side 1 to be the multihoming one, 
and market side 2 to be the singlehoming one. 
 
Proposition 2: On a competitive bottleneck two-sided market with homogeneous platforms, 
the OPM profit strictly exceeds the TPM profit if ( ) ( ) ( )
21211211
,,5.05.0, NnNnpNnp !"<" . 
Vice versa, the TPM profit strictly exceeds the OPM profit if 
( ) ( ) ( )
21211211
,,5.05.0, NnNnpNnp !">"  and 0
1
2
1 >
!
!
q
p , or in any case if 0
1
2
1 <
!
!
q
p . 
Proof: By perfect symmetry on the TPM, we know that the total number of agents on the 
singlehoming side is equally shared among both platforms as prices and the numbers of agents 
per platform on the multihoming side will be identical on both platforms. Hence, we know 
that the number of agents per platform on the singlehoming side is given by 
22
5.0 Nn != . 
Multihoming agents will focus on the price and the number of singlehoming agents on each 
platform. Therefore, the TPM profit can be described as 
 ( ) ( )2122211121 2,2,2),( nnpnnnpnnnTPM !!!+!!=" . 
Taking into account that 
22
5.0 Nn != , we can rewrite the TPM profit as 
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(1) ( ) ( )2122211121 ,5.0,2),( NnpNNnpnNnTPM !+!!!=" . 
Under OPM 
! 
n
i
= N
i
, hence the OPM profit can be rewritten as 
(2) ( ) ( )2122211121 ,,),( NnpNNnpnNnOPM !+!=" . 
Comparing equations (1) and (2), it is easy to see that the second term on the right-hand side 
of both equations is identical for any given 
! 
(n
1
,N
2
) , which implies that the profit generated 
from the singlehoming side is equal under both markets structures. Focusing on the profit 
from the multihoming side, we find that 
! 
"
OPM
(n
1
,N
2
) >"
TPM
(n
1
,N
2
), if 
( ) ( ) ( )
21211211
,5.0,2, NnNnpNnp !""> . The opposite result – that is 
! 
"
OPM
(n
1
,N
2
) <"
TPM
(n
1
,N
2
) – holds, if ( ) ( ) ( )21211211 ,5.0,2, NnNnpNnp !""<  and 
! 
"p
1
"q
2
1
> 0. In 
case that 
! 
"p
1
"q
2
1
< 0, we can immediately see that ( ) ( ) ( )
21211211
,5.0,, NnNnpNnp !"< , and 
therefore 
! 
"
OPM
(n
1
,N
2
) <"
TPM
(n
1
,N
2
). 
(q.e.d.) 
 
To understand the economic intuition of Proposition 2, let us first remember that the agents’ 
willingness to pay depends on the number of agents from the other market side that are on the 
same platform. In other words, the willingness to pay, represented by the inverse demand 
functions, depends on the magnitude of the indirect network effect agents are exposed to. 
Taking into account that under TPM those multihoming agents, who join the one platform, 
also join the other platform, singlehoming agents are exposed to the same magnitude of the 
externality in TPM and OPM for any given 
! 
n
1
. Their willingness to pay is therefore 
unaffected with respect to the externality, when comparing both market structures. If we 
denote the profit functions in the 
! 
(n
1
,N
2
)  space, this is reflected by the equality of the terms 
that represent revenues from the singlehoming market side 2. Multihoming agents are under 
TPM only exposed to the network effects caused by half of the total number of agents from 
side 2. If multihoming agents are negatively affected by the presence of singlehoming agents, 
i.e. 0
1
2
1 <
!
!
q
p , the magnitude of this negative effect is lower under TPM than under OPM, and 
therefore the willingness to pay of side 1 agents is higher for the TPM than for the OPM, 
which translates into TPM profit exceeding OPM profit. 
If the multihoming agents’ willingness to pay is positively affected by the number of 
singlehoming agents, i.e. if 0
1
2
1 >
!
!
q
p , there are two effects in opposite directions: Firstly, if 
there are two platforms, multihoming agents join both of them, and hence, the platform 
operator can multiply revenues by offering more platforms. This effect has already been 
discussed, when giving the intuition for Proposition 1. Secondly, because multihoming agents 
are exposed to an externality of lower magnitude in the TPM, their willingness to pay is 
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lower than in the OPM. Proposition 2 states that if the first effect is stronger than the second 
effect, a TPM is more profitable than an OPM, while the OPM is more profitable if the 
second effect outweighs that is, if network effects are strong enough. 
 
Case 3 
Now we assume that both market sides singlehome. Proposition 3 summarizes the 
corresponding implications. 
 
Proposition 3: In case that agents on either side of the market are restricted to singlehoming, 
OPM profit strictly exceeds TPM profit, if ,0>
!"
"
i
i
i
q
p  where 
! 
i =1,2. Vice versa, TPM profit 
strictly exceeds OPM profit, if 0<
!"
"
i
i
i
q
p . 
Proof: OPM profit can be denoted as 
(3) 
! 
"OPM N1,N2( ) = N1 # p1 N1,N2( ) + N2 # p2 N1,N2( ) = Ni # pi Ni,N$ i( )
i=1
2
% . 
By the assumption of perfect symmetry on the TPM, we know that the total number of 
agents of each market side will be equally shared between both platforms, i.e. 
2,1,5.0 =!= iNn
ii
. Hence, singlehoming agents of market side i  meet 
i
N!"5.0  agents of 
market side i!  on each platform. Therefore, in ),( 21 NN  space TPM profit can be denoted as 
(4) ( ) ( ) ( )!
=
"##=##+##=$
2
1
2122211121 5.0,,5.05.0,),(
i
iiiiTPM NNpNNNpNNNpNNN . 
Comparing (3) and (4), we see that both terms on the right hand side of (3) strictly exceed 
their counterparts in (4), if 0>
!"
"
i
i
i
q
p . Vice versa, both terms on the right hand side of (4) exceed 
their counterparts in (3), if 0<
!"
"
i
i
i
q
p , which constitutes the result. 
(q.e.d.) 
 
Proposition 3 describes the effect of rivalry in patronage on both market sides. When 
discussing the economic intuition of Proposition 2, we stated that there are two opposing 
effects, if the indirect network externality is positive for both market sides, i.e. if 0>
!"
"
i
i
i
q
p . The 
first effect originated in the ability of side 1 agents to multihome. This effect, of course, 
vanishes if agents are restricted to singlehoming. The second effect was a downward-shift in 
the willingness to pay due to the lower magnitude of the externality under TPM, because on 
each platform there is only half the number of agents from the other side, while under OPM 
all agents are on the same platform. Hence, different from the discussion of Proposition 2, 
revenues from market side 1 are strictly lower for the TPM than for the OPM. Another 
difference is that this argument now holds for both market sides, while in Case 2 market 
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side 2 was unaffected, because market side 1 was able to multihome. Therefore, given positive 
externalities, OPM profit strictly exceeds TPM profit. Analogously, if network effects are 
negative for both market sides, i.e. if 0<
!"
"
i
i
i
q
p , agents on each market side are exposed to a 
negative externality that is smaller in magnitude in TPM than in OPM, which translates to 
TPM profits strictly exceeding OPM profits. 
In case of mixed indirect network effects, i.e. 0,0 <> !!
! "
"
"
"
i
i
i
i
i
i
q
p
q
p , a simple comparison of general 
profit functions does not suffice to draw conclusions. Whether TPM or OPM yields higher 
profits for a given 
! 
N
1
,N
2( ), depends on the price difference between both market forms, 
weighted by the corresponding 
! 
N
i
. Assume, for instance, that market side 1 experiences 
positive externalities and market side 2 experiences negative externalities. Then, if  
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]
21221222112111
,,5.05.0,, NNpNNpNNNpNNpN !"">"!"  
it follows that OPM profit exceeds TPM profit. This illustrates the key message of our 
paper, which is: Whether OPM or TPM is the appropriate benchmark, depends on the 
specific situation studied. It depends not only on whether agents are restricted to 
singlehoming or are allowed to multihome, as well as on the direction and magnitude of the 
indirect externality, but also on size (represented by 
! 
N
i
), and willingness to pay (represented 
by ( )ii
i
qqp
21
, ) of each market side. 
So far, we only studied general profit functions as a whole, and not their optimal values. The 
reason is simply the fact that with regard to the message of our paper, we do not gain from 
comparing first-order conditions of a general environment. In specific settings with specific 
functional forms, it might however be possible and helpful to determine optimal solutions and 
compare them in OPM and TPM, as we will demonstrate using the model of Armstrong 
(2006) in a subsequent section. 
 
4. Heterogeneous Platforms 
 
In this section, we expand our analysis to heterogeneous platforms. The probably most 
widely used framework used in the literature builds on the Hotelling (1929) model. We build 
our analysis on Armstrong (2006), which is a seminal paper that studies heterogeneous 
platforms in a Hotelling-type setting. Armstrong’s singlehoming model assumes specific 
(symmetrical) functional forms for each market side’s demand function that are derived from 
an additive-separable utility function. While such a specific formulation has of course some 
disadvantages3, it is not only tractable analytically, but also allows us to derive both OPM 
                                                
3 For a discussion, see Armstrong (2006). 
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and TPM demand functions as coming from the same utility function. Note, however, that 
Armstrong’s OPM model is not directly comparable to his setting of duopolistic competition, 
because his OPM model is not built into a Hotelling setting, while his duopoly model is. In 
order to directly compare OPM and TPM, we therefore assume that in the OPM case the 
platform is located in the middle of the Hotelling line that is at location 0.5. We consider two 
cases of the TPM: To show that our results from the previous section transfer to Armstrong’s 
model, we first assume that both platforms in the TPM are also located at 0.5 that is, 
platforms are homogeneous. Afterwards, we study the effects of platforms being located at 
points 0 and 1 on the Hotelling line, as in Armstrong (2006). 
Under OPM assume that the utility of agents on market side i , 
! 
U
i
, can be described by the 
utility function 
(5) 
! 
Ui =" in j # pi # 0.5 # x( )ti i, j =1,2 i $ j , 
if the agent’s preferred location x on the Hotelling line is to the left, and by 
(6) 
! 
Ui =" in j # pi # x # 0.5( )ti i, j =1,2 i $ j , 
if the agent’s preferred location is to the right of the platform’s location, which is 0.5 by the 
assumption made above. 
Parameter 
! 
"
i
 represents the constant marginal indirect network effect of one agent of market 
side j being present on the same platform, and 
! 
t
i
 is the transportation cost parameter. 
Since Armstrong does not impose a nonnegativity constraint on utility – actually the 
indifferent consumer obtains negative utility in his duopoly equilibrium – we assume a 
reservation utility 
! 
u
i
, which represents the minimum utility, an agent requires to join the 
platform. Setting (5) and (6) equal to 
! 
u
i
 and solving for x yields the locations of those agents, 
who just obtain their reservation utility, and are hence indifferent between joining and not 
joining the platform. The marginal agent on the left hand side of the platform is located at 
 
! 
xi
l
=
1
2
"
# in j " pi " ui
ti
, 
while the marginal agent on the right hand side of the platform is located at 
 
! 
xi
r
=
1
2
+
" in j # pi # ui
ti
. 
Following Armstrong, we assume that agents are uniformly distributed on the Hotelling line, 
which yields the demand function 
(7) 
! 
ni =
2 " in j # pi # ui( )
ti
, 
From (7), we can easily obtain the inverse demand function as, 
 
! 
pi =" in j #
niti
2
# ui , 
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and hence OPM profit is given by 
(8) 
! 
"OPM = ni # in j $ ui $
niti
2
% 
& 
' 
( 
) 
* 
i, j=1
i+ j
2
, = Ni # iN j $ ui $
Niti
2
% 
& 
' 
( 
) 
* 
i, j=1
i+ j
2
, . 
 
This setting can easily be transferred to represent a TPM with homogeneous platforms 
located at 0.5. As platforms are homogeneous, agents obtain ceteris paribus the same utility 
on each platform. Since both market sides must singlehome, the market will be equally 
shared between both platforms, and hence, an agent, who joins a platform is exposed to the 
indirect network effect of half the number of agents in the market, which yields demand 
(9) 
! 
Ni =
" in j # 2 pi + ui( )
ti
, 
inverse demand 
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pi =" in j # niti # ui , 
and a total profit of 
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Subtracting (10) from (8), it is easy to see that for every 
! 
N
1
,N
2( ) 
! 
"
OPM
<"
TPM
hom , if 
! 
"
i
< 0, i =1,2  and 
! 
"
OPM
>"
TPM
hom , if 
! 
"
i
> 0, i =1,2 , which is in line with Proposition 3. If 
! 
"
1
> 0  and 
! 
"
2
< 0, OPM profit strictly exceeds TPM profit, if 
! 
"
1
 is greater than 
! 
"
2
 in 
absolute terms, while reservation utility levels are sufficiently high. The opposite holds, if 
! 
"
1
 
is smaller than 
! 
"
2
 in absolute terms. 
To study platform heterogeneity, we now assume that under TPM one of the platforms is 
located at point 0 on the Hotelling line, while the other platform is located at point 1. This 
situation is equal to the setting Armstrong uses to study duopolistic competition, except for 
the minor modification of reservation utility levels introduced above. As already mentioned, 
the equilibrium results imply negative utility of the indifferent agent. While competition 
between the platform operators ensures that agents will not be forced to accept infinitely 
negative utility, this property of the model will under certain conditions, result in infinitely 
high profits and infinitely low utility, if there is no reservation utility level binding the 
monopolistic platform operator. Also note that for the sake of unambiguous results, we do not 
compare profits for any ),( 21 qq anymore, but optimal solutions. 
By the assumptions made so far, specifically by the assumptions of uniform distribution of 
agents on the Hotelling line and by symmetry, we know that the indifferent agent will be 
located at point 0.5 on the Hotelling line, and that in optimum the total market is equally 
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divided between both platforms. While under platform competition, platform operators try to 
steal consumers from the competitor, a monopolist who operates both platforms will set her 
price so that the indifferent agent on each market side will just receive their reservation 
utility. The resulting optimal price is 
 
! 
phet,i
*
=
" i # ti
2
# ui , 
which yields a profit of 
(11) 
! 
"
TPM
het*
=
#
1
+#
2
$ t
1
$ t
2
2
$ u
1
$ u
2
. 
 
Armstrong’s equilibrium solution implies a utility value of ( )iji t325.0 !"+"#  for the 
indifferent agent on market side 
! 
i . We consider this utility level to be the upper bound of 
reservation utility that is, we assume ( )ijii tu 325.0 !"+"#< . Note that for 
( )
ijii
tu 325.0 !"+"#= , (11) becomes 
! 
"
TPM
het*
= t
1
+ t
2
#$
1
#$
2
, which is exactly the 
equilibrium profit, if both platforms compete (Armstrong’s equation (13), p. 675). 
Optimizing (8) with respect to 
! 
n
1
 and 
! 
n
2
 yields an OPM profit of 
(12) 
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"
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2
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2
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2
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For simplicity, assume that 
! 
u
1
= u
2
. Then for 
! 
"
i
> 0, i =1,2 , it still holds that 
! 
"
OPM
*
>"
TPM
het* , 
as was the case with homogeneous platforms. If we additionally assume that 
21
tt = , then for 
! 
"
i
< 0  it holds that 
! 
"
OPM
*
<"
TPM
het* .4 In case that 
! 
"
1
> 0  and 
! 
"
2
< 0, we obtain ambiguous 
results. Summarizing our findings, we see that all results are in line with Proposition 3. 
Hence, we can conclude that platform heterogeneity is per se not sufficient to disprove the 
results of our paper. 
5. Conclusions 
Selecting the appropriate benchmark is the basic step when analyzing the effects of market 
concentration. On two-sided markets it is therefore of essential interest to know, how many 
platforms a monopolist will operate. She has to trade-off additional revenues that could be 
gained when operating an additional platform and the loss of revenues due to cannibalization. 
Determinants in this respect are whether agents single- or multihome on one or on both 
market sides and whether agents perceive the indirect network externality as positive or 
negative. Our analysis follows these situations systematically and shows that in some of them 
                                                
4 These results were established using Mathematica. The code will be provided from the authors upon request. 
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there is an unambiguous tendency towards one (or multiple) platforms, while in other 
situations general analysis remains ambiguous. In some cases, ambiguity can be resolved, if 
details like characteristics of the demand functions and the relative sizes of the market sides 
are known. We also demonstrated that platform heterogeneity does not resolve the problem 
per se. Table 1 summarizes the results for homogeneous platforms. 
 +/+ +/- -/+ -/- 
multi/multi TPM TPM TPM TPM 
multi/single ambiguous ambiguous TPM TPM 
single/single OPM ambiguous ambiguous TPM 
Table 1: Market characteristics and number of platforms under monopoly. Columns: sign of the externality on 
market side 1 / market side 2. Rows: multi- or singlehoming agents on market side 1 / market side 2. 
In the introduction we gave the example of eBay buying a German rival and closing this 
platform. This was in 1999, when German internet users had smallband access available 
only,5 and internet service providers offered two-part tariffs, i.e. users had to pay extra for 
every minute they spent online. With slow and expensive internet access, users are less likely 
to use more than one internet auction platform, especially, if buyers find the same sellers on 
both platforms and vice versa. Therefore, we interpret this example as being a “single/single; 
+/+” situation. Our analysis finds that in this situation the OPM solution is more profitable. 
The case is different for the South Korean eBay example, where the acquisition took place 10 
years later. South Korea is among those countries with the highest broadband penetration 
rate,6 so using more than one platform, e.g. to compare prices, is easy for buyers, and offering 
on more than one platform is easy for sellers. We should therefore interpret this as an 
example for a “multi/multi; +/+” situation for which our analysis finds strong incentives to 
keep the additional platform. The examples of the movie theaters represent a “multi/single; 
+/-“ situation, as advertisers are able to advertise in multiple cinemas, while moviegoers can 
only be in one movie theater at the same time. Advertisers obviously benefit from many 
people seeing their ads, while moviegoers are likely to be ad-averse. For such a situation we 
found that either OPM or TPM can be more profitable. The decisive criterion is by 
Proposition 2 the intensity of the indirect network effect on the multihoming side, i.e. 
advertisers’ valuation of moviegoers, which might well differ between the two cities 
considered. NASCAR allows fans to multihome by scheduling Nationwide races on 
                                                
5 Two years later, by the end of 2001, only 2.4% of the population had broadband access to the internet 
(Source: OECD Broadband Portal on http://www.oecd.org/). 
6 In 2008, one third of the population had broadband internet access (Source: OECD Broadband Portal on 
http://www.oecd.org/). 
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Saturdays and Sprint Cup races on Sundays. Sponsors are of course able to participate in both 
series, so that there is a “multi/multi” case, and the coexistence of the two series is consistent 
with our analysis. 
Our analysis provides some guidelines in which direction – one or more platforms – a 
specific model is likely to tend. As a rule of thumb, we can say that factors relaxing 
competition for patronage make way for additional platforms, while factors that increase 
cannibalization render a single platform solution more attractive. It is, however, not our 
intention to give a complete “cooking recipe”, which puts out the appropriate benchmark, as 
there are numerous additional determinants well-known from traditional industries, e.g. 
economies of scale and fixed costs, which all have to be taken into account. Identifying the 
appropriate benchmark will in most cases probably require (numerical) evaluation of the 
corresponding optimal solutions, and therefore specific functional forms that allow for such 
an analysis. Due to this complexity, we also cannot generally answer the question of how 
using an inappropriate benchmark influences results qualitatively. However, we emphasize 
that it is important to be aware of this problem in theory as well as in applied research. In 
theory, results would be at least biased quantitatively in terms of prices, quantities, and 
welfare, when using an inappropriate benchmark. Models that encompass several situations, 
for instance all-positive and mixed perception of the externality, might need to use different 
benchmarks for each situation. In practice, assessment of proposed mergers needs to 
anticipate the post-merger situation in order to give meaningful recommendations. 
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